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Abstract
We introduce a new class of context dependent, incomplete information games to
serve as structured prediction models for settings with significant strategic interac-
tions. Our games map the input context to outcomes by first condensing the input
into private player types that specify the utilities, weighted interactions, as well as
the initial strategies for the players. The game is played over multiple rounds where
players respond to weighted aggregates of their neighbors’ strategies. The predicted
output from the model is a mixed strategy profile (a near-Nash equilibrium) and
each observation is thought of as a sample from this strategy profile. We introduce
two new aggregator paradigms with provably convergent game dynamics, and
characterize the conditions under which our games are identifiable from data. Our
games can be parameterized in a transferable manner so that the sets of players can
change from one game to another. We demonstrate empirically that our games as
models can recover meaningful strategic interactions from real voting data.
1 Introduction
Structured prediction methods [1, 2, 3, 4] typically operate on parametric scoring functions whose
maximizing assignment is used as the predicted configuration. Since the parameters can be learned
directly to maximize prediction accuracy, often via surrogate losses, the methods have been successful
across areas [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10]. However, not all structured observations can be naturally modeled as
extrema of scoring functions. For instance, votes on a bill in the US Congress pertain to actions or
strategies adopted by individual senators following several rounds of negotiations with a subset of
other senators. These votes do not generally correspond to any common scoring function, and should
be modeled as an equilibrium rather than a maximizing assignment [11, 12].
Previous work has considered outcomes as pure strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE) of some fixed
underlying graphical game [12, 13, 14, 15], where the payoff of a player depends on its own strategy
and the (aggregate) strategy of its neighbors in a graph. The advantage of pure strategies is that the
observations can be directly related to actions taken in the game. The parameters of the game such as
interactions are thus readily adjustable on the basis of observed action profiles. A drawback of this
family of models is that PSNE do not exist in a wide class of games [16], and they require players
to have sufficient (complete) information about the actions of other players. Moreover, the setup
entirely side-steps the issue of game dynamics, i.e., how the equilibrium is arrived at in the game,
reducing the ability to use equilibrium as a predicted outcome in a context dependent manner. The
key estimation procedures in most PSNE based approaches [12, 13] are also combinatorially hard.
From the point of view of applicability, the models are also tailored to a fixed set of players, and thus
do not enable inference about the behavior of new players.
We address these issues by extending the scope of structured prediction to games. At a high level,
our model takes the available context such as a bill or a resolution to be voted on – the input –
and maps it to a predicted outcome which is an action profile. We model the impact of context by
parametrically mapping it to private information for each player (player types) which is subsequently
incorporated into player utilities and their initial strategy profiles. We adopt mixed strategy Nash
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equilibria (MSNE) that exist in any game, unlike PSNE. Since player types are hidden, we call our
parametrized games Latent Aggregative Games (LAGs). Our games can be viewed as a conditional
version of directed graphical games [17, 18], restricted to a rich subclass called aggregative games
that subsumes Cournot oligopoly, mean field, public goods, and population games [12]. Aggregative
games shield each player from specific information about any neighbor since players respond to
aggregate (weighted sum) of their neighbors’ strategies.
A key novelty of our approach is to explicitly incorporate game dynamics that specifies how the
predicted equilibrium is derived from the context. In our approach, we follow a k-step best response
dynamics, seeded with predicted initial strategies, to arrive at a (near) mixed strategy equilibrium.
An observed outcome, in response to the context, is then viewed as a sample from this predicted
mixed strategy equilibrium. As we operate on continuous strategies and our updates are differentiable
functions, we can use standard back-propagation to evaluate gradients through the k-step strategy
updates, and thus learn parameters efficiently, unlike e.g. [12, 13]. We also generalize strategic
prediction to transferable games where the sets of players may change from one game to another. To
this end, we incorporate players into the game in terms of their feature representations, and learn a
mechanism for mapping these features and the context into payoffs, strategic interactions as well as
initial strategies. These games permit us to predict the behavior of new players in new contexts.
Since game dynamics plays a critical role in strategic prediction, we introduce and provide a deeper
analysis of more general dynamics and types of aggregation strategies. Our work pins down exact
conditions under which strategies converge to different types of equilibrium. Convergence to Nash
equilibria has been known largely for a restricted class of games, e.g., two player zero-sum and
potential games [19], and multiplayer games are known to be considerably more difficult [20, 21, 22,
23, 24, 25, 26, 27]. Our analysis makes use of tools from control theory, dynamical systems, and
stochastic approximation [28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33], and thus contributes to this line of work as well.
Finally, we provide identifiability guarantees for LAGs. For the analysis, we adopt a simpler one-
shot setting, where the observed outcome is sampled from player strategies after one round of
communication instead of following k-steps to a near mixed strategy equilibrium. We characterize
conditions under which one-shot LAGs become identifiable, i.e., we can recover the neighbors of any
player with the correct sign of their interaction (positive or negative). Such recovery is infeasible
under PSNE since multiple game structures may pertain to the same set of PSNE [14, 34].
2 Basic strategic prediction model
We first introduce our basic strategic prediction model. To this end, we need to define several
components of the model. These include (a) the graphical layout of the game, and how players
influence each other; (b) the player types (private information) and how these are derived from
the context; (c) initial strategies for the players before witnessing the play of others; (d) individual
utilities for the players; (e) and the game dynamics, i.e., how players respond to others. Later, in the
transferable setting, we will no longer individuate players through their identities but instead adopt
feature vectors for players.
Let G = (E, V ) be a connected digraph such that vertex i identifies player i ∈ [n] , {1, 2, . . . , n},
where n = |V |. Let A be the (common) finite discrete set of actions for all the players, and let
Ti ⊆ R|A| be the latent type set for player i, defined shortly. Each player i plays a randomized
(mixed) strategy which is a distribution over actions: σi ∈ 4(A) such that
∑
ai∈A σi(ai) = 1 and
σi(ai) ≥ 0 for ai ∈ A. We will denote a joint strategy profile of all the players by (σi, σ−i) to
emphasize the distinction between player i and all others. We model the influence of players on others
through weighted aggregation of neighbor strategies. The weights wij ∈ R denote the strength of
influence of player j on player i. We will call players j ∈ [n]\{i} that have wij 6= 0 the neighbors of
players i. We define a weight matrix W ∈ Rn×n such that W (i, i) = 0 and W (i, j) = wij . Player i
communicates with other players only through aggregatorAi that maps the strategies of other players,
i.e., σ−i to the weighted sum
∑
j 6=i wijσj , the effective influence of others. The context influences
the game through private types of players. This mapping could be defined in multiple ways. For
simplicity, we initially parameterize the private type of each player i ∈ [n] by a linear transformation
or matrix θi : X → Ti that maps context x ∈ X ⊆ Rd to zi(x) = θix. We will keep the dependence
on context implicit, for simplicity, and abbreviate zi(x) as zi from here on when the context is clear.
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We model the utility or payoff of player i ∈ [n], of type zi ∈ Ti, under strategy profile (σi, σ−i) as:
Ui(σi, σ−i, zi) = σ>i (Ai(σ−i)− zi) + τH(σi) , (1)
where H(σi) is the entropy associated with σi and τ ≥ 0. The entropy encourages completely mixed
strategy choices, in the interior of simplex ∆(A). Our payoff functions generalize linear influence
games that describe several decision scenarios such as whether to vaccinate against a disease, install
antivirus software, or get home insurance [15, 14, 34]. We allow multi-way actions and private types,
thus capturing a wider range of strategic behaviors. The payoffs may be interpreted as the expected
reward received by players in a repeated game. We can naturally define the best response of player i
when it observes the aggregate input Ai(σ−i) to be
βτi (Ai(σ−i), zi) ∈ arg max
σi∈4(Ai)
Ui(σi, σ−i, zi) . (2)
We say that (σ∗i , σ
∗
−i, zi, z−i) forms an MSNE or simply a Nash equilibrium (NE) of LAG iff
Ui(σ
∗
i , σ
∗
−i, zi) ≥ Ui(σi, σ∗−i, zi) ∀i ∈ [n], σi ∈ 4(A) . (3)
Every finite game has at least one MSNE [35]. We say that MSNE is strict (SNE) when (3) is
strict for all i ∈ [n], σi ∈ ∆(A) \ {σ∗i }, completely mixed (CMNE) when σ∗i (ai) > 0 for all
i ∈ [n], ai ∈ A, and pure (PSNE) when for all i ∈ [n] there exists an ai ∈ A such that σ∗i (ai) = 1. It
remains to specify how an equilibrium is reached, i.e., the game dynamics. To begin with, players
observe context x, and evaluate types zi. Our setting dispenses with the restrictive assumption
made by Bayesian games [36, 37, 38] that the conditional distribution P (z−i|zi) is known to player
i. In our case, the types give rise to initial strategies σ0i = ψ(zi), where ψ : Ti → ∆(A) (e.g.
softmax). The best response dynamics from this point on depends on the details of the aggregator
and whether the dynamics is defined over strategies or actions directly. We study several alternative
game dynamics with different aggregators in Section 4. In our empirical analysis, we adopt a simpler
k-step corrective dynamics as described below. Once a (near) equilibrium is reached, a sample action
profile y ∈ Y ⊆ An is drawn from player strategies.
Parameter estimation. We learn our games from data as structured prediction methods. Specifically,
given a dataset D = {(x(m), y(m)) ∈ X × Y,m ∈ [M ]} linking contexts to sampled action profiles,
our objective is to estimate the type parameters θi and the influences of neighbors wi , (wij)j 6=i, i ∈
[n]. Each pair (x(m), y(m)) is treated as follows. A linear transformation θˆ = (θˆ1, . . . , θˆn) maps
the context x(m) to the types zˆ(x(m)) , (zˆ(m)1 , . . . , zˆ
(m)
n ) that result in initial strategies σˆ0i (x
(m)) =
ζ(zˆ
(m)
i ) of the players i ∈ [n], where ζ is the softmax nonlinearity. The aggregators Aˆi evaluate
weighted sums, and are parametrized by weights wˆi = (wˆij)j 6=i. A sequence of k update steps
σˆt+1i (x
(m)) = ζ(ν(σˆti) + α(Aˆi(σˆt−i)− zˆ(m)i )), t = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1, (4)
is then followed: k and α are hyperparameters, and ν defines the type of update. Several choices
of ν are possible; e.g., ν(σˆti) = 0 pertains to best response β
1/α
i (Aˆi(σˆt−i), zˆ(m)i ) defined in (2), and
the identity mapping ν(σˆti) = σˆ
t
i defines a gradient step. Our estimation criterion for the game is to
minimize the expected cross-entropy loss E[`(σˆk(x(m)), y(m)] between the predicted mixed strategies
and the observed profiles, where the expectation is with respect to the empirical distribution over
pairs (x(m), y(m)), ` is the cross entropy loss, and σˆk(x(m)) , (σˆki (x(m)))i∈[n]. We use standard
backpropagation to evaluate gradients through the k-step strategy updates efficiently.
3 Transferable strategic prediction
Here we generalize LAGs to permit different players from one game to another. Unlike in section 2,
we can no longer assume a fixed interaction structure across games. Instead, the neighbor influences
are determined by context and player feature vectors. The model enables us to predict the behavior
of new players in new contexts. Specifically, we construct a feature vector bi ∈ B for each player
i ∈ [n]. Such information is often publicly available, e.g., education and gender of judges; human
development indicators of countries, etc. Each game is played with a different subset of players
I ⊆ [n], and is unrolled as follows. A context x ∈ X is mapped to latent (more general) player
types using a parametric function fz : X × B → Z , taking each pair (x, bv), v ∈ I as input, and
mapping it to zx,v ∈ Z . The latent types define initial strategies as before σ0x,v = φ(Γzx,v), where
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Γ is a transformation matrix that yields a vector in R|A|, and φ (e.g., softmax) maps the result to a
distribution in the simplex ∆(A). Unlike before, the (asymmetric) influences between players are
now calculated parametrically from the types: wx,v,v′ = fw(zx,v, zx,v′) using a parametric mapping
fw : Z × Z → R. Each player v still responds to other players v′ ∈ I \ {v} through its aggregator
Ax,v,I(σx,−v) ,
∑
v′∈I:v′ 6=v
wx,v,v′σx,v′ .
We can extend the definition of the payoffs slightly to incorporate the more general latent types:
Uv,I(σx,v, σx,−v, zx,v) = σ>v (Ax,v,I(σx,−v))− Γzx,v) .
where Γ is an additional parameter matrix to be learned. The game dynamics dictates the course of
play in the same fashion as the basic strategic setting. We learn the model, now parameterized by fz ,
fw, and Γ, by minimizing the loss between predicted k-step strategies and observed action profiles.
4 General game dynamics and convergence
We now provide an in-depth look at the game dynamics along with associated convergence guarantees.
The aggregator in the game acts as a privacy preserving component, hiding specific neighbor actions
or strategies, only offering aggregate statistics. We design dynamics under two different kinds of
feedback from the aggregator. In an active aggregator (AA) setting, the players get a prediction about
the anticipated aggregate of their neighbors. In contrast, a passive aggregator (PA) only provides the
aggregate of empirical frequencies used by the neighbors, and changes in the aggregate are estimated
by the player. Intuitively, AA reveals more information about the neighbors’ strategy evolution. We
devise two new protocols as derivative action adaptations of smooth fictitious play (FP) and gradient
play (GP) [39, 40, 41, 42, 43] for aggregative games. The protocols differ by how players respond to
the (predicted) aggregate: one can play the best response or adapt the strategy via a gradient update.
Formally, player i samples an action aki ∼ σki at time k > 0 based on
qki = q
k−1
i + (eak−1i
− qk−1i )/k ∈ ∆(A) ; σki = gi(Ai(h−i(qk−i)), zi) , (5)
where qki is the empirical frequency of actions played by i till time k, and gi : R|A| × R|A| → ∆(A)
and hi : R|A| → R|A| are appropriately defined Lipschitz mappings possibly involving small input
noise. We let qk−1−i , {qk−1j |j 6= i}, and h−i(qk−1−i ) , {hj(qk−1j )|j 6= i}. We also define the base
case q0i = σ
0
i = φ(zi). Note that player i communicates only withAi. We define a passive aggregator
(PA) by letting hi be the identity mapping, i.e. hi(qi) = qi. Alternatively, when hi(qi) = qi + γ∇q˜i
for some γ > 0 and a difference approximation∇q˜i of a temporal derivative∇qi, we obtain an active
aggregator (AA). Intuitively, AA views each qj as discretization of a continuous signal qj(t) so that
when ∇q˜j(t) ≈ ∇qj(t), for neighbors j of i, we have
hj(qj(t)) ≈ qj(t) + γ∇qj(t) ≈ qj(t+ γ) =⇒ Ai(h−i(q−i(t))) ≈ Ai(q−i(t+ γ)),
and therefore Ai offers a predicted aggregate to player i. We consider two forms of best response
dynamics encoded in gi, LAG-FP and LAG-GP, based on derivative FP and derivative GP, respectively.
In LAG-FP we set τ > 0 in the utility functions. This lets us have a unique best response:
(LAG-FP) AA yields uk : gi(uk, zi) = βτi (u
k, zi),
PA yields uk : gi(uk, zi) = βτi (u
k + γ∇uˆk, zi),
where the AA case differs from PA in terms of where the difference approximation happens. In AA,
it happens prior to aggregation thus gi is defined directly in terms of the output of AA or u¯k which
absorbs any temporal approximation error. In PA, the player constructs a temporal prediction of the
aggregate, and the approximation is (∇uk −∇uˆk). In LAG-GP, we set τ = 0, and player i takes a
gradient step to maximize the anticipated payoff followed by a Euclidean projection to get a unique
mapping gi (since any such projection on a closed convex set is unique):
(LAG-GP) AA yields uk : gi(uk, zi) = Π∆(qi + uk − zi),
PA yields uk : gi(uk, zi) = Π∆(qki + u
k + γ∇uˆk − zi),
where Π∆(q) , argminq˜∈4(A) ||q˜ − q||2 . Thus under both protocols, players take actions stochas-
tically according to σki and the best response mapping gi is unique for each k. Assuming that the
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(LAG-FP/AA) q˙i = βτi (Ai(q−i + γr˙−i), zi)− qi, r˙i = λ(qi − ri) (6)
(LAG-FP/ PA) q˙i = βτi (Ai(q−i) + γr˙i, zi)− qi, r˙i = λ(Ai(q−i)− ri) (7)
(LAG-GP/AA) q˙i = Π∆[qi +Ai(q−i + γr˙−i)− zi]− qi, r˙i = λ(qi − ri) (8)
(LAG-GP/PA) q˙i = Π∆[qi +Ai(q−i) + γr˙i − zi]− qi, r˙i = λ(Ai(q−i)− ri) (9)
error sequence in updating {σki } is a martingale, our updates satisfy the conditions in (section 2.1,
[28]) and we can analyze the stochastic evolution of each LAG as a noisy discretization of a limiting
ordinary differential equation (ODE). We investigate the conditions under which the fixed points of
the this ODE are locally asymptotically stable, and as a consequence, our discrete updates would
converge to a Nash equilibrium with positive probability [43]. An equilibrium point s is locally
asymptotically stable if every ODE trajectory that starts at a point in a small neighborhood of s
remains forever in that neighborhood and eventually converges to s. Our updates in (5) lead to the
implicit ODEs (6)-(9) for LAG-FP and LAG-GP under AA and PA settings, where λ > 0, r˙i is an
estimate for q˙i, and r˙−i , {r˙j |j 6= i, wij 6= 0}. We call a matrix stable if all its eigenvalues have
strictly negative real parts. Let I denote the identity matrix. We now specify conditions under which
dynamics converge to CMNE or SNE in the PA setting. We defer the convergence to NE in the PA
setting, and all convergence results in the AA setting to the supplementary material.
Theorem 1. (LAG-GP/PA convergence to CMNE) Let the weight matrix W be stochastic. Let
(q∗1 , . . . , q
∗
n, z1, . . . , zn) be a completely mixed NE under the dynamics in (9). The linearization of
(9) with γ > 0 is locally asymptotically stable for λ > 0 if and only if the following matrix is stable[
(1 + γλ)W −γλW
λW −λI
]
.
Theorem 2. (LAG-GP/PA convergence to SNE) Let the weight matrix W be doubly stochastic.
Let (q∗1 , . . . , q
∗
n, z1, . . . , zn) be a strict NE under the dynamics in (9). The equilibrium point (qi =
q∗i , ri = Ai(q
∗
−i))i∈[n] is locally asymptotically stable for sufficiently small γλ, where γ, λ > 0.
Our results have important implications. [12, 13] enforced margin constraints on payoffs in their
PSNE setups. They did not establish SNE, which guarantees a strictly worse payoff to any player
that unilaterally deviates from equilibrium. Theorem 2 specifies the conditions for convergence to
SNE, and dictates when margin constraints should be imposed. The classic fictitious play (FP) fails to
converge in simple games, e.g. [42], that have a unique CMNE. Theorem 1 specifies conditions that
circumvent such negative results. We prove our results via carefully crafted Lyapunov and Hurwitz
stability analyses. We provide all the detailed insights and proofs in the supplementary material.
5 Identifiability of the games
We now characterize the conditions under which LAGs become identifiable in terms of strategic
interactions. Our recovery procedure is a novel adaptation of the primal-dual witness method [44]
to games. Specifically, we estimate from data D the support Si or the set of neighbors of i defined
wrt to the unknown influences w∗ij 6= 0. We also recover the correct sign of these influences. We
focus on the one-shot setting (i.e., k = 1) with the gradient update so that the observed outcome is
sampled from player strategies after one round of communication. We also use binary actions to
simplify the exposition. We denote by φ(m)j the probability assigned by the initial strategy σ
0
j (x
(m))
to action 1 for player j on example m. Let `i(wi;D) be the average cross-entropy loss between
one-step strategies under candidate weights wi , (wij)j 6=i and the observed actions for player i, and
λ > 0 be a regularization parameter. We solve the following problem for each player i ∈ [n]:
arg min
wi∈Rn−1
`i(wi;D) + λ||wi||1 , (10)
Let HMi be the sample Hessian ∇2`i(wi;D) under wi, and H∗Mi pertain to true weights w∗i . Let
Λmin(·) and Λmax(·) denote the minimum and the maximum eigenvalues. The following assumptions
serve as our analogues of the conditions for support recovery in Lasso [44] and Ising models [45]:
Λmin
(
H∗Mi,SS
) ≥ α2Cmin, |||H∗Mi,ScS(H∗Mi,SS)−1|||∞ ≤ 1− γ (11)
Λmax
(
1
M
M∑
m=1
Φ
(m)
−i Φ
(m)>
−i
)
≤ Cmax, where Φ(m)−i , (φ(m)j )j 6=i , (12)
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where Cmin > 0, Cmax < ∞, γ ∈ (0, 1]; |||A|||∞ is the maximum over L1-norm of rows in A;
H∗Mi,SS is the submatrix obtained by restricting H
∗M
i to rows and columns corresponding to neighbors,
i.e., players in Si, andH∗Mi,SSc is restricted to rows pertaining to Si and columns to S
c
i (non-neighbors).
Let the number of neighbors for any player be at most d ≤ n− 1. We have the following result.
Theorem 3. Let M >
802C2max
C4min
(
2− γ
γ
)4
d2 log(n), and λ ≥ 8α(2− γ)
γ
√
log(n)
M
. Suppose
the data satisfies assumptions (11), and (12). The following results hold with high probability for
each i ∈ [n]: (a) the corresponding optimization problem (10) has a unique solution, i.e., a unique
set of neighbors for i, and (b) the set of predicted neighbors of i is a subset of the true neighbors.
Additionally, the predicted set contains all true neighbors j for which |w∗ij | ≥ 10
√
dλ/(α2Cmin).
6 Experiments
We now describe the results of our experiments that provide insights into some important aspects
of our games. We first show that LAG qualitatively recovers the known strategic behavior of the
Justices in the longest serving US Supreme Court. We also provide quantitative evidence that LAG
outperforms the prior methods on two different measures. We then demonstrate that the structure
estimated by LAG on the UN General Assembly data [46] is meaningful, and helps unravel the
subtle behavior of member countries. Finally, we present evidence to underscore that LAGs can be
effectively transferred to predict strategies in new settings with different sets of players.
We found that LAGs performed well over a wide range of hyperparameters. We implemented the
models in sections 2 and 3 with L1 regularization for structure estimation as described in section
5. Our models performed well for a wide range of α, λ, and k. We report the results with k = 5,
α = 0.1, and λ = 0.1 for all our experiments, except the transferable setting where we set α = 0.01
and λ = 0.1 We set ν to be the identity function in (4). We trained our models in batches of size 200,
with default settings of the RMSprop optimizer in PyTorch. To account for effect of randomness
in neural training toward structure estimation, we averaged the parameters of each model across
5 independent runs. We ordered the influence of neighbors based on the corresponding estimated
average weights from the most positive to the most negative.
6.1 US Supreme Court Data
We included all the cases from the Rehnquist Court, during the period 1994-2005 that had votes
documented for all the 9 Justices (i.e. our players). Justices Rehnquist (R), Scalia (Sc), and Thomas
(T) represented the conservative side; Justices Stevens (St), Souter (So), Ginsburg (G), and Breyer
(B) formed the liberal bloc; and Justices Kennedy (K) and O’Connor (O), often called swing votes,
followed a moderate ideology. Our contexts comprise of 32 binary attributes that characterize the
specifics of the appeal, e.g., the disposition of lower court. Our observation outcome y(m) for each
context x(m) pertains to the corresponding votes of the Justices. The votes belong to one of the
three categories: yes, no, or complex. Fig. 1 describes in detail how our method yields a structure
that is qualitatively consistent with the known jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court. Specifically,
(a) the conservatives and the liberals form two separate coherent, strongly-connected blocs that are
well-segregated from each other, and (b) they influence the moderates but not vice-versa.
Fig. 2 provides a detailed quantitative comparison that reveals how LAG compared favorably with
both the prior PSNE based methods [12, 13] on two separate measures: (a) recovering edges consistent
with the ideology of the Justices, and (b) coherence in terms of size of the cut, i.e., minimum number
of edges to be removed in order to decompose the recovered structure into the constituent blocs.
6.2 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Data
Our second dataset consists of the roll call votes of the member countries on the resolutions considered
in the UN General Assembly. Each resolution is a textual description that provides a context while
the votes of the countries on the resolution pertain to the observed outcome. We compiled data on
1We did not imposeL1 penalty in the transferable setting since the interactions are learned for new individuals,
i.e., they are not specific to any fixed set of players, unlike the basic setting.
6
OR
Sc
T K
G So
B St
(a) Positive Influence
O
T K
St
So
R
B
Sc
G
(b) Negative Influence
Figure 1: Supreme Court structure recovery with LAGs: (a) and (b) show, respectively, justices
with the most positive and the most negative influence, quantified by wˆij , on each Justice i. The
estimated connections are consistent with the known jurisprudence of the Court. In particular, (a)
shows coherence between the conservatives (red), that between the liberals (blue), and the separation
of these ideologies from the moderates (green). Likewise, (b) shows all the negative connections are
between the blocs. The moderates K and O do not have outgoing connections to the liberals and the
conservatives. This emphasizes, in particular, that the moderates espouse a centrist viewpoint and do
not exercise strong influence on others, positive or otherwise. Note that determining influences based
on heuristics like ordering by pairwise vote agreements does not work; e.g, that would imply K had a
strong positive influence on R, since R agreed with K more than with anyone else.
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(c) Tree Structured Potential Game [13]
Figure 2: Quantitative comparison with prior methods: (a), (b), and (c) show the structures
estimated by LAG, local AG [12], and tree structured potential game [13] on US Supreme Court
data. Since only the conservatives (red nodes) and liberals (blue nodes) are known to influence the
moderates (green nodes) and not vice-versa, we define a correct edge to be one that either (1) connects
two nodes of same color in any direction, or (2) goes outward from a red or blue node into a green
node. One way to quantify the quality of recovery is to compute the fraction of correct edges. All 18
edges recovered by LAG are correct, and therefore its recovery score is maximum possible, i.e., 1. In
contrast, Local AG [12] gets edges {(O, R), (O, T), (O, Sc), (O, B), (K, Sc), (K, T)} wrong for a score
of only 16/22, i.e. 0.73. Finally, [13] yields undirected edges. Treating each edge as bidirectional, we
note that [13] estimates 16 edges out of which it makes mistakes on {(O, So), (St, R), (R, St), (St,
Sc), (Sc, St)}, and thus registers a score of 11/16, i.e., 0.69. Yet other way to evaluate is a cut, i.e.,
minimum number of edges to be removed to decompose the structure into its three components (reds,
blues, and greens). A low value of cut quantifies high coherence within each component, and thus
pertains to a good structure. The cut size for LAG (3) is much lower than other methods (6 each).
all resolutions in UNGA from 1992 onward to understand the interactions of member nations since
the dissolution of the Soviet Union. We considered 25 countries that have dominated the United
States (USA) politics, and are generally known to belong to one of the two blocs: pro-USA, namely,
Australia (AUS), Canada (CAN), France (FRA), Germany (GER), Israel (ISR), Italy (ITA), Japan
(JPN), South Korea (KOR), Norway (NOR), Ukraine (UKR); and others, namely, Afghanistan (AFG),
Belarus (BLR), China (CHN), Cuba (CUB), Iran (IRN), Iraq (IRQ), Mexico (MEX), Pakistan (PAK),
Philippines (PHL), North Korea (PRK), Kazakhstan (KAZ), Russia (RUS), Syria (SYR), Venezuela
(VEN) and Vietnam (VNM). We used pretrained GLoVe embeddings to represent each resolution as
a 50-dimensional context vector x(m). Each vote was interpreted to take one of the three values: 1
(yes), 2 (absent/abstain), or 3 (no), and we represented y(m) as a 26-dimensional vector.
Fig. 3 shows the structure estimated by our method, i.e., the weights wˆi learned for each country
i. The weights wˆij , j 6= i have a natural interpretation in terms of influence: the more positive wij
is, the more positive the influence of j on i. A similar connotation holds for the negative weights.
To aid visualization, we disentangle the positive and the negative connections, and depict only the
most influential connections for either case. Fig. 3 describes how our method estimated a meaningful
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(a) Positive influence (b) Negative influence
Figure 3: UNGA structure recovery with LAGs: Incoming arrows show (a) 2 countries with the
most positive influence (black edges), and (b) 2 countries with the most negative influence (magenta
edges), quantified by wˆij , on each country i. The estimated links are largely consistent with the
expected alignments. In particular, (a) shows the two blocs (in yellow and green) are well segregated
from each other. More interesting alignments are revealed, e.g., (1) strong affinity between NATO
members on one side, and Syria, Iran, Venezuela etc. on the other, (2) link from Germany and
Korea to Russia hinting at the trade influence despite their differences, and (3) geographical influence
of Russia and Ukraine on Belarus. Additionally, (b) reveals that a significant fraction of negative
connections emanate from or end at Israel and USA on one side, and some yellow node on the other.
(a) Type similarity (b) Transfer performance
Figure 4: (Left) Incoming arrows show 2 countries with the highest cosine similarity
θˆ>i θˆj/(||θˆi|| ||θˆj ||) for each country i. Type vectors were reasonably well aligned for members
in the same bloc. (Right) LAGs were more effective in predicting strategies for new players.
structure, and unraveled subtle influences beyond the prominent two-bloc structure. The learned type
parameters θˆi were also found to be similar for members in the same bloc (Fig. 4).
Our final set of experiments focused on transferring LAGs. Besides UNGA data, we compiled
a 73-dimensional feature vector for each country from its HDI Indicators [47]. We then kept
aside three-fourths of the data to set up games over small sets of players by randomly sampling 5
countries independently for each context. The left-out players from these contexts were then sampled
independently to get another set of 5 countries per context. We call these two sets A and B. We
formed a third set C of 5 countries per game from the untouched data (i.e. the one-fourth fraction).
Thus, A and B were defined on the same contexts, that were disjoint from C. We averaged results
over 10 such independent triplets (A, B, C) to mitigate sampling effects. We trained a model for A
using the procedure in section 3, and computed the loss on B. Our baseline, train empirical, used the
empirical distribution of actions for each player i over the games it participated in A as its predicted
strategy for the games in B and C. The loss of LAGs (0.852) turned out to be lower than the baseline
(0.865) on C. Moreover, as Fig. 4 shows, the loss of LAGs (0.696) was found to be significantly lower
than the baseline (0.720) on B even though HDI does not fully reflect complex country characteristics.
Thus, our results clearly underscore the benefits of using LAGs for strategic prediction.
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Strategic Prediction with Latent Aggregative Games
(Supplementary Material)
A Convergence of dynamics
We first provide some insight into our proof techniques. We prove convergence to SNE via carefully
crafted Lyapunov functions V that are locally positive definite and have a locally negative semidefinite
time derivative, and thus satisfy the Lyapunov stability criterion. The other proofs track the evolution
of game dynamics around an equilibrium, where q˙i = 0 and r˙i = 0. Specifically, we analyze
conditions under which the Jacobian matrix of the linearization is Hurwitz stable, i.e., all the
eigenvalues have negative real roots, and exploit the fact that the behavior of the ODE near equilibrium
is same as its linear approximation when the real parts of all eigenvalues are non-zero. Our discrete
updates would then converge to a Nash equilibrium with positive probability [43].
Recall that AA reveals more information about the evolution of neighbors’ strategy. As a result, the
PA settings, i.e. (7) and (9), require additional subtle reasoning since at equilibrium r∗i converges
only to Ai(q∗−i) and not to q∗i . Since qi evolves within ∆(A), stochasticity assumptions are required
to ensure ri stays within the probability simplex as well. Note that the LAG-FP updates to strategies
are smooth due to the entropy term (since τ > 0), unlike LAG-GP. Consequently, the results for
LAG-GP require a separate treatment of completely mixed NE and strict NE, unlike LAG-FP where
they can be analyzed without distinction. Note that τ > 0 ensures that best response is a singleton set
and therefore we could leverage the ODE formulations. Differential inclusions [30, 31] could be used
instead to handle τ = 0. Our stability conditions can be simplified further when λ is sufficiently large,
whence the behavior may be understood solely in terms of γ. In general, via standard eigenvalue
arguments [43], our protocols admit stable linearization under mild conditions.
We now provide detailed proofs on convergence of dynamics. We use AA1, AA2 etc. to indicate that
the result pertains to convergence in an active aggregator setting. Likewise, we will use PA1 etc. for
the passive aggregator setting. We start with the active aggregator.
Theorem AA1. (Convergence under LAG-FP/AA to NE) Let (q∗1 , . . . , q∗n, z1, . . . , zn) be a NE
under the dynamics in (6). There exists a matrix D such that the linearization of (6) with γ > 0 is
locally asymptotically stable for λ > 0 if and only if the following matrix is stable[−I + (1 + γλ)D −γλD
λI −λI
]
.
Proof. Since τ > 0, best response is a singleton set, and the unique best response σ∗i can be obtained
by setting the gradients of the payoff functions to 0. In particular, we have the best response
βτi (Ai(σ−i), zi) = ζ
(∑
j 6=i wijσj − zi
τ
)
= ζ
(Ai(σ−i)− zi
τ
)
, (13)
where ζ is the softmax function with output coordinate ` given by
(ζ(x))` = exp(x`)
/∑
k
exp(xk).
Now recall from (6) that we have the following ODE:
q˙i = β
τ
i (Ai(q−i + γr˙−i), z∗i )− qi︸ ︷︷ ︸
,Fi(qi,q−i,r−i)
(14)
r˙i = λ(qi − ri). (15)
Since βτi maps it input to the simplex ∆(A), we note that the right side of (14) is a difference between
two probability distributions. Therefore this difference must sum to zero. Moreover, since |A| = m,
we have m − 1 degrees of freedom that can be used to express this difference. Therefore, we can
investigate the evolution of qi via a matrix N ∈ Rm×(m−1) of (m− 1) orthonormal columns such
that
N>N = Im−1, and 1>mN = 0m−1,
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where Im−1 is the identity matrix of order m− 1, and 1m and 0m are m-dimensional vectors with
all coordinates set to 1 and 0 respectively. We will sometimes omit the subscripts for Im, 1m, and
0m when the size will be clear from the context. The equilibrium (q∗i , q
∗
−i) corresponds to a point
(qi(t) = q
∗
i , q−i(t) = q
∗
−i, ri(t) = q
∗
i , r−i(t) = q
∗
−i) of the dynamics. It will be convenient to
investigate the dynamics as the evolution of deviations around this point. Since qi is confined to
∆(A), we can express
qi(t) = q
∗
i +Nδxqi(t),
where δxqi(t) ∈ Rm−1 is uniquely specified, and likewise ri = q∗i + δxri(t) for some δxri(t). Thus,
we can define a block diagonal matrix N ∈ R2nm×2n(m−1), with each diagonal block set to N and
all other elements set to 0, such that
(q1(t)− q∗1 , . . . , qn(t)− q∗n, r1(t)− q∗1 , . . . , rn(t)− q∗n)> = N δx(t) , (16)
where
δx(t) = (δxq1(t), . . . , δxqn(t), δxr1(t), . . . , δxrn(t))
> ∈ R2n(m−1)
is formed by stacking together the deviations at time t in a column vector. Then, the following is
immediate from (16):
N>(q1(t)− q∗1 , . . . , qn(t)− q∗n, r1(t)− q∗1 , . . . , rn(t)− q∗n)> = N>N δx(t) = δx(t). (17)
Denote the Jacobian matrix obtained by taking derivatives of vector y with respect to vector x by Jxy.
We will linearize q˙i = Fi(qi, q−i, r−i) in (14) around , (q∗1 , q∗−1, q∗1 , q∗−1) using first order Taylor
series. Then, since q˙∗i = 0, we note from (14) and (17) that
δ˙xqi = N
>(q˙i − q˙∗i ) = N>q˙i(t) = N>Fi(qi, q−i, r−i). (18)
Now, at equilibrium, we have q˙i = 0 for all i ∈ [n], and therefore we have from (14) that
Fi(q
∗
i , q
∗
−i, r
∗
−i) = 0m.
Let diag(b) be a diagonal matrix with vector b on the diagonal and all other elements set to 0.
Ignoring the second order and higher terms, we therefore have by the Taylor series approximation
that
Fi(qi, q−i, r−i)
≈
n∑
k=1
JqkFi(qk, q
∗
−k, q
∗
−k)
∣∣∣∣
qk=q∗k
(qk − q∗k) +
∑
k 6=i
JrkFi(q
∗
k, q
∗
−k, q
∗
−ki, rk)
∣∣∣∣
rk=q∗k
(rk − q∗k)
=
n∑
k=1
JqkFi(qk, q
∗
−k, q
∗
−k)
∣∣∣∣
qk=q∗k
Nδxqk +
∑
k 6=i
JrkFi(q
∗
k, q
∗
−k, q
∗
−ki, rk)
∣∣∣∣
rk=q∗k
Nδxrk
= −Nδxqi +
∑
k 6=i
JqkFi(qk, q
∗
−k, q
∗
−k)
∣∣∣∣
qk=q∗k
Nδxqk +
∑
k 6=i
JrkFi(q
∗
k, q
∗
−k, q
∗
−ki, rk)
∣∣∣∣
rk=q∗k
Nδxrk
= −Nδxqi + (1 + γλ)
∑
k 6=i
D˜ikNδxqk − γλ
∑
k 6=i
D˜ikNδxrk ,
where D˜ik ,
wik
τ
∇ζ
(
Ai(q
∗
−i)− zi
τ
)
, and ∇ζ(b) , diag(ζ(b))− ζ(b)ζ>(b) .
Define Dik = N>D˜ikN . Since N>N = Im−1, it follows immediately from (18) that
δ˙xqi = −δxqi + (1 + γλ)
∑
k 6=i
Dikδxqk − γλ
∑
k 6=i
Dikδxrk . (19)
Linearizing (15), we see that the Taylor approximation results in
δ˙xri = λ(δxqi − δxri). (20)
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We define
D =

0 D12 D13 . . . D1n
D21 0 D23 . . . D2n
...
...
...
. . .
...
Dn1 Dn2 Dn3 . . . 0
 .
Combining (19) and (20) together, we can write
δ˙x =
[−I + (1 + γλ)D −γλD
λI −λI
]
δx.
The statement of the theorem now follows immediately from the Hurwitz stability criterion.
Theorem AA2. (Convergence under LAG-GP/AA to CMNE) Let (q∗1 , . . . , q∗n, z1, . . . , zn) be a
completely mixed NE under the dynamics in (8). Then the linearization of (8) with γ > 0 is locally
asymptotically stable for λ > 0 if and only if the following matrix is stable[
(1 + γλ)W −γλW
λI −λI
]
.
Proof. Recall the ODE from (8):
q˙i = Π∆[qi +Ai(q−i + γr˙−i)− zi]− qi (21)
r˙i = λ(qi − ri). (22)
At equilibrium (q∗1 , . . . , q
∗
n, z1, . . . , zn), q˙i = 0 and r˙i = 0. Therefore, using (26), we have:
q∗i = Π∆[q
∗
i +Ai(q∗−i)− zi].
Since the equilibrium is completely mixed, q∗i is in the interior of ∆(A). We invoke Lemma 4.1 in
[43] to get the following:
NN>(Ai(q∗−i)− zi) = 0 (23)
Π∆[q
∗
i +Ai(q∗−i)− zi + δy]− q∗i = NN>
(
Ai(q∗−i) − zi + δy
)
,
for δy sufficiently small, and N as defined in the proof of Theorem AA1. Then, for a sufficiently
small deviation δx, where δx is as defined in Theorem 1, we get the following dynamics:
q˙i = NN
>[Ai(q−i + γr˙−i)− zi] (24)
r˙i = λ(qi − ri). (25)
Linearizing these equations and noting that N>N = I , we get
δ˙xqi = N
>
NN>(1 + γλ)∑
k 6=i
wikNδxqk
 − N>
NN>γλ∑
k 6=i
wikNδxrk

= (1 + γλ)N>
∑
k 6=i
wikNδxqk − γλN>
∑
k 6=i
wikNδxrk
= (1 + γλ)
∑
k 6=i
wikδxqk − γλ
∑
k 6=i
wikδxrk ,
and
δ˙xri = λ(δxqi − δxri).
It follows immediately that
δ˙x =
[
(1 + γλ)W −γλW
λI −λI
]
δx,
where the weight matrix
W =

0 w12 w13 . . . w1n
w21 0 w23 . . . w2n
...
...
...
. . .
...
wn1 wn2 wn3 . . . 0
 .
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Theorem AA3. (Convergence under LAG-GP/AA to SNE) Let (q∗1 , . . . , q∗n, z1, . . . , zn) be a strict
NE under the dynamics in (8). The associated equilibrium point (qi = q∗i , q−i = q
∗
−i, ri = q
∗
i , r−i =
q∗−i) is locally asymptotically stable for any γ > 0 and λ > 0.
Proof. Recall the ODE from (8):
q˙i = Π∆[qi +Ai(q−i + γr˙−i)− zi]− qi (26)
r˙i = λ(qi − ri). (27)
To prove the local asymptotic stability of the ODE dynamics, we will define a Lyapunov function V
that is locally positive definite and has locally negative semi-definite time derivative. Consider
V(qi, q−i, ri, r−i)
, 1
2
n∑
i=1
(
(qi − q∗i )>(qi − q∗i ) + λ(ri − qi)>(ri − qi)
)
. (28)
We define the shorthand di , qi +Ai(q−i + γr˙−i)− zi. Applying the chain rule, we see that the
time derivative of V ,
V˙ =
n∑
i=1
(
∂V
∂qi
)>
q˙i +
n∑
i=1
(
∂V
∂ri
)>
r˙i
=
n∑
i=1
[(qi − q∗i ) + λ(qi − ri)]> q˙i − λ2
n∑
i=1
(ri − qi)>(ri − qi)
=
n∑
i=1
(qi − q∗i )>q˙i + λ
n∑
i=1
(qi − ri)>q˙i − λ2
n∑
i=1
||ri − qi||2
=
n∑
i=1
(qi − q∗i )>Π∆(di)−
n∑
i=1
(qi − q∗i )>qi + λ
n∑
i=1
(qi − ri)>q˙i − λ2
n∑
i=1
||ri − qi||2.
Also, we note that
n∑
i=1
||q˙i||2 =
n∑
i=1
||Π∆(di)− qi||2
=
n∑
i=1
||Π∆(di)||2 +
n∑
i=1
q>i qi − 2
n∑
i=1
q>i Π∆(di).
This immediately implies
V˙ +
n∑
i=1
||q˙i||2 =
n∑
i=1
(Π∆(di)− q∗i )> (Π∆(di)− qi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(B)
+ λ
n∑
i=1
(qi − ri)>q˙i − λ2
n∑
i=1
||ri − qi||2.
Consider (B) = (Π∆(di)− q∗i )> (Π∆(di)− qi). Since ∆(A) is a convex set, the projection property
implies
[Π∆(di)]
> (Π∆(di)− qi) ≤ d>i (Π∆(di)− qi) ,
whence we note
(B) = (Π∆(di)− q∗i )> (Π∆(di)− qi)
= [Π∆(di)]
> (Π∆(di)− qi)− (Π∆(di)− qi)> q∗i
≤ d>i (Π∆(di)− qi)− (Π∆(di)− qi)> q∗i
= (di − q∗i )> (Π∆(di)− qi)
= (qi +Ai(q−i + γr˙−i)− zi − q∗i )> (Π∆(di)− qi) .
Now, we note from the definition of V in (28) that by decreasing the distances (qi− ri) and (qi− q∗i ),
we can make V(qi, q−i, ri, r−i) arbitrarily close to 0 from the right. In other words, we can consider
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a sufficiently small neighborhood around the equilibrium such that as ri, qi → q∗i , (B) tends to
(q∗i +Ai(q−i∗ + δy)− zi − q∗i )> (Π∆(di)− q∗i )
= (Ai(q−i∗ + δy)− zi)> (Π∆(di)− q∗i ) ,
= (Π∆(di)− q∗i )>
∂Ui(qi, q
∗
−i + δy, zi)
∂qi
∣∣∣∣
qi=q∗i
< 0
for some sufficiently small δy and Π∆(di) 6= q∗i . The last inequality follows since
(q∗1 , . . . , q
∗
n, z1, . . . , zn) is a strict Nash equilibrium, whereby (a) (q
∗
i , q
∗
−i) is a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium (sinceAi(·) is a linear transformation and the payoff maximization happens at the vertex),
the and (b) q∗i is a (strictly) best response to q
∗
−i and nearby strategies. Therefore, we see from (29)
that for a sufficiently small neighborhood around the equilibrium point,
V˙ ≤ −
n∑
i=1
||q˙i||2 + λ
n∑
i=1
(qi − ri)>q˙i − λ2
n∑
i=1
||ri − qi||2
= −
n∑
i=1
(||q˙i||2 + λ2||ri − qi||2)+ λ n∑
i=1
(qi − ri)>q˙i
≤ −
n∑
i=1
(||q˙i||2 + λ2||ri − qi||2) + 1
2
n∑
i=1
(||q˙i||2 + λ2||ri − qi||2)
= − 1
2
n∑
i=1
(||q˙i||2 + λ2||ri − qi||2) ,
where we have invoked the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality in the penultimate line. Since this quantity
is non-positive, we see that V˙ is locally negative semi-definite. Finally, it is clear from (28) that
V(qi, q−i, ri, r−i) > 0 in the neighborhood (qi, q−i, ri, r−i) of the equilibrium point (qi = q∗i , q−i =
q∗−i, ri = q
∗
i , r−i = q
∗
−i), and V(q∗i , q∗−i, q∗i , q∗−i) = 0. Thus, V is locally positive definite, and the
statement of the theorem follows.
We will now characterize conditions for convergence in the passive aggregator setting.
Theorem PA1. (Convergence under LAG-FP/PA to NE) Let the weight matrix W be stochastic.
Let (q∗1 , . . . , q
∗
n, z1, . . . , zn) be a NE under the dynamics in (7). There exists a matrix D1 with zero
diagonal, and a block diagonal matrix D2 such that the linearization of (7) with γ > 0 is locally
asymptotically stable for λ > 0 if and only if if the following matrix is stable[−I + (1 + γλ)D1 −γλD2
λW −λI
]
.
Proof. We reproduce the ODE from (7):
q˙i = β
τ
i (Ai(q−i) + γr˙i), zi)− qi (29)
r˙i = λ(Ai(q−i)− ri). (30)
Note that at equilibrium r˙i = 0, but unlike Theorem AA1, ri does not converge to q∗i . Specifically,
we note that the equilibrium (q∗i , q
∗
−i) corresponds to a point (qi(t) = q
∗
i , q−i(t) = q
∗
−i, ri(t) =Ai(q∗−i)), i ∈ [n], of the dynamics. Therefore, we will instead linearize around this point. Since the
weight matrix W is stochastic, we must have Ai(q∗−i) ∈ ∆(A). Therefore, we can investigate the
deviation of ri around Ai(q∗−i) with the help of matrix N defined in Theorem AA1. In particular, we
can express the deviation vector δx = (δxq1 , . . . , δxqn , δxr1 , . . . , δxrn)
> as:(
q1(t)− q∗1 , . . . , qn(t)− q∗n, r1(t)−A1(q∗−1), . . . , rn(t)−An(q∗−n)
)>
= N δx(t), (31)
where the block diagonal matrixN is as defined in Theorem AA1. Linearizing around our equilibrium
point and proceeding similarly to Theorem AA1, we get
δ˙xqi = −δxqi + (1 + γλ)
∑
k 6=i
Dikδxqk − γλCiδxri . (32)
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where
Dik ,
wik
τ
N>∇ζ
(
Ai(q
∗
−i)− zi
τ
)
N,
Ci ,
1
τ
N>∇ζ
(
Ai(q
∗
−i)− zi
τ
)
N,
and
∇ζ(b) , diag(ζ(b))− ζ(b)ζ>(b),
with ζ(b) the same as in Theorem AA1. Additionally, we have
δ˙xri = λ
∑
k 6=i
wikδxqi − λδxri . (33)
Recall that the weight matrix
W =

0 w12 w13 . . . w1n
w21 0 w23 . . . w2n
...
...
...
. . .
...
wn1 wn2 wn3 . . . 0
 .
Define
D1 ,

0 D12 D13 . . . D1n
D21 0 D23 . . . D2n
...
...
...
. . .
...
Dn1 Dn2 Dn3 . . . 0
 , and
D2 ,

C1 0 0 . . . 0
0 C2 0 . . . 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 0 . . . Cn
 .
Then, the proof follows by combining (32) and (33), since we can express the deviations as
δ˙x =
[−I + (1 + γλ)D1 −γλD2
λW −λI
]
δx.
Theorem PA2. (Convergence under LAG-GP/PA to CMNE) Let the weight matrix W be stochas-
tic. Let (q∗1 , . . . , q
∗
n, z1, . . . , zn) be a completely mixed NE under the dynamics in (9). Then the
linearization of (9) with γ > 0 is locally asymptotically stable for λ > 0 if and only if the following
matrix is stable [
(1 + γλ)W −γλW
λW −λI
]
.
Proof. Recall the ODE from (9):
q˙i = Π∆[qi +Ai(q−i) + γr˙i − zi]− qi (34)
r˙i = λ(Ai(q−i)− ri). (35)
At equilibrium (q∗1 , . . . , q
∗
n, z1, . . . , zn), q˙i = 0 and r˙i = 0. Therefore, using (34), we have:
q∗i = Π∆[q
∗
i +Ai(q∗−i)− zi].
Proceeding along the lines of proof of Theorem AA2, for a sufficiently small deviation δx as defined
in Theorem PA1, we can equivalently analyze the following dynamics:
q˙i = NN
>[Ai(q−i) + γr˙−i − zi]
r˙i = λ(qi − ri).
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Linearizing these equations and noting N>N = I , we get
δ˙xqi = N
>
NN>(1 + γλ)∑
k 6=i
wikNδxqk
 − N>
NN>γλ∑
k 6=i
Nδxrk

= (1 + γλ)N>
∑
k 6=i
wikNδxqk − γλN>
∑
k 6=i
wikNδxrk
= (1 + γλ)
∑
k 6=i
wikδxqk − γλ
∑
k 6=i
wikδxrk ,
and
δ˙xri = λ
∑
k 6=i
wikδxqi − λδxri .
It follows immediately that
δ˙x =
[
(1 + γλ)W −γλW
λW −λI
]
δx,
where the weight matrix
W =

0 w12 w13 . . . w1n
w21 0 w23 . . . w2n
...
...
...
. . .
...
wn1 wn2 wn3 . . . 0
 .
Theorem PA3. (Convergence under LAG-GP/PA to SNE) Let the weight matrix W be doubly
stochastic. Let (q∗1 , . . . , q
∗
n, z1, . . . , zn) be a strict NE under the dynamics in (9). The associated
equilibrium point (qi = q∗i , ri = Ai(q
∗
−i))i∈[n] is locally asymptotically stable for sufficiently small
γλ, where γ > 0 and λ > 0.
Proof. Recall the ODE from (9):
q˙i = Π∆[qi +Ai(q−i) + γr˙i − zi]− qi
r˙i = λ(Ai(q−i)− ri).
We will prove local asymptotic stability via a Lyapunov function V that is locally positive definite
and has locally negative semi-definite time derivative. Consider
V(qi, q−i, ri, r−i) , 1
2
n∑
i=1
(
(qi − q∗i )>(qi − q∗i ) + λ (ri −Ai(q−i))> (ri −Ai(q−i))
)
. (36)
We define the shorthand d˜i , qi +Ai(q−i) + γr˙−i − zi. Applying the chain rule, we see that the
time derivative of V ,
V˙ =
n∑
i=1
(
∂V
∂qi
)>
q˙i +
n∑
i=1
(
∂V
∂ri
)>
r˙i
=
n∑
i=1
(qi − q∗i )− λ∑
k 6=i
wki(rk −Ak (q−k))
> q˙i − λ2 n∑
i=1
(ri −Ai(q−i))> (ri −Ai(q−i)))
=
n∑
i=1
(qi − q∗i )>q˙i − λ2
n∑
i=1
||ri −Ai(q−i)||2 − λ
n∑
i=1
∑
k 6=i
wki(rk −Ak (q−k))
> q˙i .
Also, we note that
n∑
i=1
||q˙i||2 =
n∑
i=1
||Π∆(d˜i)− qi||2
=
n∑
i=1
||Π∆(d˜i)||2 +
n∑
i=1
q>i qi − 2
n∑
i=1
q>i Π∆(d˜i).
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Proceeding along the lines of Theorem AA3, for sufficiently small γλ and sufficiently small neigh-
borhood around the equilibrium point, we can show that
V˙ ≤ −
n∑
i=1
||q˙i||2 + λ
n∑
i=1
∑
k 6=i
wki(Ak (q−k)− rk)
> q˙i − λ2 n∑
i=1
||ri −Ai(q−i)||2
= −
n∑
i=1
(||q˙i||2 + λ2||ri −Ai(q−i)||2) + n∑
i=1
∑
k 6=i
wki
(
λ(Ak (q−k)− rk)> q˙i
)
≤ −
n∑
i=1
(||q˙i||2 + λ2||ri −Ai(q−i)||2) + 1
2
n∑
i=1
∑
k 6=i
wki
(
λ2||rk −Ak(q−k)||2 + ||q˙i||2
)
by noting that wki ≥ 0 for all i ∈ [n], k 6= i and invoking Cauchy-Schwarz. Furthermore, since
W is doubly stochastic, we have
∑
k 6=i wki = 1 and
∑
k 6=i wik = 1 for all i ∈ [n]. Thus, we may
decompose the second term on the right in the last equation as
1
2
n∑
i=1
∑
k 6=i
wki
(
λ2||rk −Ak(q−k)||2 + ||q˙i||2
)
=
λ2
2
n∑
i=1
∑
k 6=i
wki||rk −Ak(q−k)||2 + 1
2
n∑
i=1
||q˙i||2
∑
k 6=i
wki
=
λ2
2
n∑
i=1
∑
k 6=i
wki||rk −Ak(q−k)||2 + 1
2
n∑
i=1
||q˙i||2.
The first term in the last equation may be interpreted as a weighted outgoing flow from player i to
player k 6= i. Now viewing this from the dual perspective of the total incoming flow, we equivalently
have
V˙ ≤ −
n∑
i=1
(||q˙i||2 + λ2||ri −Ai(q−i)||2) + λ2
2
n∑
i=1
∑
k 6=i
wik||ri −Ai(q−i)||2 + 1
2
n∑
i=1
||q˙i||2
= −
n∑
i=1
(||q˙i||2 + λ2||ri −Ai(q−i)||2) + λ2
2
n∑
i=1
||ri −Ai(q−i)||2
∑
k 6=i
wik +
1
2
n∑
i=1
||q˙i||2
= −
n∑
i=1
(||q˙i||2 + λ2||ri −Ai(q−i)||2) + 1
2
n∑
i=1
(
λ2||ri −Ai(q−i)||2 + ||q˙i||2
)
= −1
2
n∑
i=1
(
λ2||ri −Ai(q−i)||2 + ||q˙i||2
)
≤ 0,
which implies that V˙ is locally negative semi-definite. The local positive definiteness of V may be
argued along the same lines as the proof of Theorem AA3 and we are done.
B Identifiability of one-shot LAGs
We now present the results on provably recovering the structure of one-shot LAGs from data.
Specifically, we characterize the conditions under which LAGs with one step dynamics become
identifiable, and provide an algorithm to recover the structure of the game, i.e., the neighbors for each
player i ∈ [n] with the signs (positive or negative) of their respective influences.
Our recovery procedure adapts the primal-dual witness method [44] for structure estimation in games.
The method has previously been applied in several non-strategic settings such as Lasso [44] and Ising
models [45]. Recently, [34] employed this method to recover a set of pure strategy Nash equilibria
(PSNE) from data consisting of a subset of PSNE, and a small fraction of non-equilibrium outcomes
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assumed to be sampled under their noise models in the setting of linear influence games. However, the
problem of structure recovery is significantly harder: it is known [14, 34] that the problem becomes
non-identifiable in the setting of PSNE, since multiple game structures may pertain to the same
of PSNE. To our knowledge, there are no known results on the provable recovery of structure of
graphical games from data. We fill this gap by characterizing conditions under which one-shot LAGs
become identifiable.
Our approach follows the general proof structure of primal-dual witness method in the context of
model selection for Ising models [45]. However, our setting is significantly different from the setting
in [45] where context and dynamics play no part, and all the observed data is assumed to be sampled
from a common (global) distribution expressible in a closed form. In contrast, each observed outcome
in our setting is sampled from a separate joint strategy profile following one-step of dynamics initiated
under a different context.
Specifically, in the one-shot setting, consider a dataset D = {(x(m), a(m)) ∈ X × Y,m ∈ [M ]}
where a(m) is the action profile (i.e. observed outcome) sampled from the joint player strategies after
one round of communication. Assume that the type parameters θ = (θ1, . . . , θn) are known. Then,
since types for any context are determined by the parameters θ, we have access to the player types
z(m)(x(m)) = (z
(m)
1 , . . . , z
(m)
n ), which in turn determine determine the initial strategies for all the
examples m ∈ [M ]. We focus on binary actions here since they let us simplify the exposition while
conveying the essential ideas. Specifically, each player i ∈ [n] initially plays action 1 with probability
φ
(m)
i = ξ(z
(m)
i ) ,
1
1 + exp(−z(m)i )
,
and the action 0 with probability 1 − φ(m)i . We define φ(m) = (φ(m)1 , . . . , φ(m)n ), and
Φ
(m)
−i = (φ
(m)
j )j 6=i. We focus on the gradient update setting where after one round of com-
munication, player i responds to its neighbors with its updated strategy (σ∗(m)i , 1− σ∗(m)i ), where
σ
∗(m)
i , ξ
φ(m)i + α(∑
j 6=i
w∗ijφ
(m)
j − z(m)i )
 ,
such that α > 0, and w∗ij ∈ R is the true influence (i.e. interaction weight) of player j ∈ [n] \ {i}
on i. Recall that we call player j a neighbor of i if |w∗ij | > 0. Finally, action a(m)i is sampled
from the updated strategy, and we obtain the joint profile a(m) = {a(m)i , i ∈ [n]} as the observed
outcome. Our goal is to estimate, from D and α, the support Si, or the set of neighbors j for i, i.e.,
the players that have influence w∗ij 6= 0. We can thus separate the influence of neighbors of i from
the non-neighbors by defining the set of non-zero weights w∗i,S = {w∗ij |j ∈ Si}. We denote the
complement of a set A by Ac. Thus, w∗ij = 0 for j ∈ Sci . We equivalently write w∗i,Sc = 0. We are
interested in recovering not only the support of each player i, but also the correct sign of influence
(i.e. positive or negative) of each neighbor j on i.
We consider the average cross-entropy loss between the strategy under wi and the observed outcome.
`i(wi;D) =
1
M
M∑
m=1
−
(
a
(m)
i log(σ
(m)
i ) + (1− a(m)i ) log(1− σ(m)i )
)
. (37)
We compute the gradient and the Hessian of the sample loss:
∇`i(wi;D) = α
M
M∑
m=1
(σ
(m)
i − a(m)i ) Φ(m)−i , (38)
HMi , ∇2`i(wi;D) =
α2
M
M∑
m=1
σ
(m)
i (1− σ(m)i ) Φ(m)−i Φ(m)
>
−i . (39)
We will often use the variance function ηi(wi;m) , α2σ(m)i (1− σ(m)i ) as a shorthand, and write
HMi =
1
M
M∑
m=1
ηi(wi;m) Φ
(m)
−i Φ
(m)>
−i . (40)
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We denote by H∗Mi,SS the submatrix obtained by restricting the Hessian H
∗M
i , pertaining to true
weights, to rows and columns corresponding to neighbors, i.e., players in Si. Likewise, H∗Mi,SSc
denotes the submatrix restricted to rows pertaining to Si (neighbors) and columns to Sci (non-
neighbors).
We will provide detailed analysis under sample Fisher matrix assumptions. We will omit the analysis
for the population setting that can be derived by imposing analogous assumptions directly on the
population matrices, and making concentration arguments that show these assumptions hold in
the sampled setting with high probability. Recall from the main text that we make the following
assumptions that are reminiscent of those for support recovery under Lasso [44], and model selection
in Ising models [45]. We first recall our assumptions from the main text.
Assumptions.
Λmin
(
H∗Mi,SS
) ≥ α2Cmin . (41)
Λmax
(
1
M
M∑
m=1
Φ
(m)
−i Φ
(m)>
−i
)
≤ Cmax . (42)
|||H∗Mi,ScS(H∗Mi,SS)−1|||∞ ≤ 1− γ , (43)
such that Cmin > 0, Cmax <∞, and γ ∈ (0, 1]. In our notation, |||A|||∞ denotes the maximum `1
norm across rows of matrix A, and |||A|||2 denotes the spectral norm (i.e. maximum singular value)
of A. Λmin(A) and Λmax(A) refer respectively to the minimum and the maximum eigenvalue of a
square matrix A.
Analysis. We propose to solve the following regularized problem for each player i ∈ [n] separately.
arg min
wi∈Rn−1
`i(wi;D) + λM,n,d||wi||1 , (44)
where λM,n,d > 0 is a regularization parameter that depends on the sample size M , the number of
players n, and the maximum degree (i.e. number of neighbors) of any player. For brevity, we will
omit the dependence of this parameter on n and d, and simply write λM . This problem is convex but
not differentiable everywhere because of the `1 penalty. Note that since the problem is not strictly
convex, it might have multiple minimizing solutions. For any such optimal solution wˆi, we must have
by KKT conditions,
∇`i(wˆi;D) + λM κˆi = 0 , (45)
where the subgradient κˆi ∈ Rn−1 is such that
κˆij = sign(wˆij) ∈ {±1} if wˆij 6= 0, and |κˆij | ≤ 1 otherwise. (46)
We would like to ensure the following conditions in order to recover the signed neighborhood for i.
sign(κˆij) = sign(w∗ij), ∀j ∈ Si (47)
wˆij = 0, ∀j ∈ Sci . (48)
Our analysis is built on the primal-dual witness (PDW) method [44]. This method has the following
steps. First, only for the sake of analysis, we presuppose that some Oracle provides the true neighbors
Si. Therefore, we solve the following problem to recover the signs of true neighbors.
wˆi,S = arg min
(wi,S ,0)∈Rn−1
`i(wi;D) + λM ||wi,S ||1 , (49)
We then set the components of the dual vector κi that pertain to neighbors of i to the sign of
corresponding components in wˆi,S . That is, κˆi,j = sign(wˆi,j), ∀j ∈ Si. We next set wˆi,Sc = 0,
and thus (48) is satisfied. We then solve for κˆi,Sc by plugging wˆi,S , κˆi,S , and wˆi,Sc in (45). Thus,
we are left to show that (46) and (47) are satisfied. We impose conditions on M , n, and d under
which these conditions are satisfied with high probability. In fact, we prove a stronger result for (46),
namely, strict dual feasibility for non-neighbors, i.e., |κˆi,j | < 1 for all j ∈ Sci .
We argue that our construction yields a unique optimal primal solution wˆi. Specifically, we invoke
Lemma 1 from [45] that states that so long as ||κˆi,Sc ||∞ < 1, any optimal primal solution w˜i satisfies
w˜i,Sc = 0. This is established by our construction above. Moreover, this Lemma asserts that wˆi
is the unique solution to (44) if Λmin(HˆMi,SS) > 0, i.e., if the sample Hessian under wˆi is positive
definite when restricted to the rows and columns in the true support Si. We show that assumption (41)
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implies Λmin
(
HˆMi,SS
)
≥ α2Cmin
2
> 0, and this guarantees that we correctly recover the signed
neighborhood of i.
To proceed, we define GMi = −∇`i(w∗i ;D) and rewrite (45) as
∇`i(wˆi;D)−∇`i(w∗i ;D) = GMi − λM κˆi . (50)
Applying the mean value theorem component-wise, we can write (50) as
∇2`i(w∗i ;D)(wˆi − w∗i ) = GMi − λM κˆi − RMi , (51)
where
RMi,j =
(
∇2`i(w(j)i ;D)−∇2`i(w∗i ;D)
)>
j
(wˆi − w∗i ) ,
for some vector w(j)i = tjwˆi + (1− tj)w∗i , tj ∈ [0, 1]. Here, (A)>j denotes row j of matrix A.
We are now ready to state an important lemma. We will use R1, R2 etc. to indicate that the result is
aimed toward provable recovery (i.e. identifiability) of our games.
Lemma R1. We have that
P
(
||GMi ||∞ ≥
λM
4
γ
2− γ
)
≤ 2 exp
(
− γ
2λ2M
32α2(2− γ)2M + log(n)
)
,
which converges to zero at rate exp(−Cα,λλ2MM) (where constant Cα,γ depends on α and γ)
whenever
λM ≥ 8α(2− γ)
γ
√
log(n)
M
.
Proof. We note that
GMi = −∇`i(w∗i ;D) =
1
M
M∑
m=1
−α(σ∗(m)i − a∗(m)i ) Φ(m)−i︸ ︷︷ ︸
Zi,m
,
where |Zui,m| ≤ α for each component Zmi,u of random vector Zmi . Moreover, E(Zmi,u) = 0 under w∗i ,
and Z1i,u, . . . , Z
M
i,u are independent. Invoking the Hoeffding’s inequality, we have that for any δ > 0,
P(|GMi,u| ≥ δ) ≤ 2 exp
(
−Mδ
2
2α2
)
,
where GMi,u denotes the component at index u of vector G
M
i . Setting δ =
γλM
4(2− γ) , we get
P
(
|GMi,u| ≥
γλM
4(2− γ)
)
≤ 2 exp
(
− M
2α2
γ2λ2M
16(2− γ)2
)
.
Then, applying a union bound over indices u ∈ [n− 1], we get
P
(
||GMi ||∞ ≥
γλM
4(2− γ)
)
≤ 2(n− 1) exp
(
− M
2α2
γ2λ2M
16(2− γ)2
)
< 2 exp
(
− M
2α2
γ2λ2M
16(2− γ)2 + log(n)
)
.
Lemma R2. Let λMd ≤ αC
2
min
10Cmax
and ||GMi ||∞ ≤
λM
4
. Then,
||wˆi,S − w∗i,S ||2 ≤
5
α2Cmin
λM
√
d .
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Proof. We define a function F : Rd → R that quantifies the change in optimization objective at a
distance ∆i,S from the true parameters w∗i,S . Specifically,
F (∆i,S) , `i(w∗i,S + ∆i,S ;D)− `i(w∗i,S ;D) + λM (||w∗i,S + ∆i,S ||1 − ||w∗i,S ||1) .
Note that F is convex and F (0) = 0. Moreover, F is minimized for ∆ˆi,S = wˆi,S−w∗i,S . Therefore,
F (∆ˆi,S) ≤ 0. We show that the function F is strictly positive on the surface of a Euclidean ball of
radius B for some B > 0. Then, the vector ∆ˆi,S lies inside the ball, i.e.,
||wˆi,S − w∗i,S ||2 ≤ B .
This follows since otherwise, the convex combination t∆ˆi,S + (1− t)0 would lie on boundary of the
ball for some t ∈ (0, 1), which would imply the contradiction
F (t∆ˆi,S + (1− t)0) ≤ tF (∆ˆi,S) + (1− t)F (0) ≤ 0.
Therefore, let ∆ ∈ Rd be an arbitrary vector such that ||∆||2 = B. We then have from Taylor’s series
F (∆) = ∇`i(w∗i,S ;D)>∆ + ∆>∇2`(w∗i,S + θ∆;D)∆ + λM (||w∗i,S + ∆||1 − ||w∗i,S ||1) , (52)
for some θ ∈ [0, 1]. We lower bound F (∆) by bounding each term on the right side of (52).
We let B = OλM
√
d where we will choose O > 0 later. From Cauchy-Schwartz inequality,
∇`i(w∗i,S ;D)>∆ ≥ −||∇`i(w∗i,S ;D)||∞||∆||1 (53)
≥ −||∇`i(w∗i,S ;D)||∞
√
d||∆||2 (54)
≥ −(λM
√
d)2
O
4
, (55)
where in the last inequality we have used ||∆||2 = B = OλM
√
d, and
−||∇`i(w∗i,S ;D)||∞ ≥ −||∇`i(w∗i ;D)||∞ = − || − ∇`i(w∗i ;D)||∞ = − ||GMi ||∞ ≥ −
λM
4
by our assumption on ||GMi ||∞ in the lemma statement. Next, by triangle inequality, we have
λM (||w∗i,S + ∆||1 − ||w∗i,S ||1) ≥ − λM ||∆||1 ≥ − λM
√
d||∆||2 ≥ − (λM
√
d)2O . (56)
We now bound the quantity ∆>∇2`(w∗i,S + θ∆;D)∆. We note that
∆>∇2`(w∗i,S + θ∆;D)∆ ≥ min||∆˜||2=B
∆˜>∇2`(w∗i,S + θ∆;D)∆˜
≥ min
θ˜∈[0,1]
B2Λmin(∇2`(w∗i,S + θ˜∆;D))
= B2 min
θ˜∈[0,1]
Λmin
(
1
M
M∑
m=1
ηi(w
∗
i,S + θ˜∆;m) Φ
(m)
−i Φ
(m)>
−i
)
.
Applying Taylor’s series expansion, we note that ∆>∇2`(w∗i,S + θ∆;D)∆
≥ B2Λmin
(
1
M
M∑
m=1
ηi(w
∗
i,S ;m)Φ
(m)
−i Φ
(m)>
−i
)
− B2 max
θ˜∈[0,1]
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣ 1M
M∑
m=1
η′i(w
∗
i,S + θ∆;m)(Φ
(m)>
−i θ˜∆) Φ
(m)
−i Φ
(m)>
−i
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
2
= B2Λmin(H
∗M
i,SS)−B2 max
θ˜∈[0,1]
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣ 1M
M∑
m=1
η′i(w
∗
i,S + θ∆;m)(Φ
(m)>
−i θ˜∆) Φ
(m)
−i Φ
(m)>
−i
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
2
= B2α2Cmin −B2 max
θ˜∈[0,1]
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣ 1M
M∑
m=1
η′i(w
∗
i,S + θ∆;m)(Φ
(m)>
−i θ˜∆) Φ
(m)
−i Φ
(m)>
−i
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
2
.
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Now, a simple calculation shows that |η′i(·)| ≤ α3. Moreover, we note for θ˜ ∈ [0, 1],
|Φ(m)>−i θ˜∆| ≤ ||Φ(m)−i ||∞||θ˜∆||1 ≤ ||Φ(m)−i ||∞||∆||1 ≤ ||∆||1 ≤
√
d||∆||2 = OλMd .
Putting all these facts together, along with our assumption (42), we get
∆>∇2`(w∗i,S + θ∆;D)∆ ≥ B2α2Cmin −B2α3(OλMd)Cmax ≥ B2α2
Cmin
2
(57)
when λM ≤ Cmin
2αCmaxOd
. Therefore, plugging the lower bounds from (53), (56), and (57) in (52),
F (∆) ≥ λ2Md
(
−O
4
−O + O
2α2Cmin
2
)
> 0 ,
for O =
5
α2Cmin
. Thus, for λM ≤ Cmin
2αCmaxOd
=
αC2min
10Cmaxd
, we must have
||wˆi,S − w∗i,S ||2 ≤ B = OλM
√
d =
5
α2Cmin
λM
√
d .
Lemma R3. Let λMd ≤ αC
2
min
100Cmax
γ
2− γ and ||G
M
i ||∞ ≤
λM
4
. Then,
||RMi ||∞
λM
≤ 25Cmax
αC2min
λMd ≤ 1
4
(
γ
2− γ
)
≤ γ
4
.
Proof. We have for j ∈ [n] \ {i} and some w(j)i = tjwˆi + (1− tj)w∗i , tj ∈ [0, 1],
RMi,j =
(
∇2`i(w(j)i ;D)−∇2`i(w∗i ;D)
)>
j
(wˆi − w∗i )
=
1
M
M∑
m=1
((
ηi(w
(j)
i ;m)− ηi(w∗i ;m)
)
Φ
(m)
−i Φ
(m)>
−i
)>
j
(wˆi − w∗i )
=
1
M
M∑
m=1
(
η′i(w
(j)
i ;m)
(
Φ
(m)>
−i (w
(j)
i − w∗i )
)
Φ
(m)
−i Φ
(m)>
−i
)>
j
(wˆi − w∗i ) ,
where w(j)i is a point on the line between w
(j)
i and w
∗
i , by the mean value theorem. We note that(
Φ
(m)
−i Φ
(m)>
−i
)>
j
= φ
(m)
j Φ
(m)>
−i .
We thus write
RMi,j =
1
M
M∑
m=1
η′i(w
(j)
i ;m)φ
(m)
j
(
(w
(j)
i − w∗i )>Φ(m)−i
)
Φ
(m)>
−i (wˆi − w∗i )
=
1
M
M∑
m=1
η′i(w
(j)
i ;m)φ
(m)
j
(
(w
(j)
i − w∗i )>Φ(m)−i Φ(m)
>
−i (wˆi − w∗i )
)
=
1
M
M∑
m=1
η′i(w
(j)
i ;m)φ
(m)
j︸ ︷︷ ︸
p(m)
(
tj(wˆi − w∗i )>Φ(m)−i Φ(m)
>
−i (wˆi − w∗i )
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
q(m)
,
which is of the form
1
M
p>q, where p, q ∈ RM . Thus, we have by Cauchy-Schwartz inequality,
|RMi,j | =
1
M
|p>q| ≤ 1
M
||p||∞||q||1 .
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It can be shown that p(m) = α3σ(m)i (1− σ(m)i )(1− 2σ(m)i ), whereby ||p||∞ ≤ α3.
Finally, we see that q(m) = tj
∣∣∣∣∣∣Φ(m)>−i (wˆi − w∗i )∣∣∣∣∣∣2
2
≥ 0 since tj ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore ||q||1 = q>1,
where 1 ∈ RM is a vector of all ones. Moreover, since wˆi,Sc = w∗i,Sc = 0, we note that
1
M
||q||1 = tj(wˆi − w∗i )>
(
1
M
M∑
m=1
Φ
(m)
−i Φ
(m)>
−i
)
(wˆi − w∗i )
= tj(wˆi,S − w∗i,S)>
(
1
M
M∑
m=1
Φ
(m)
−i,SΦ
(m)>
−i,S
)
(wˆi,S − w∗i,S)
≤ Cmax
∣∣∣∣wˆi,S − w∗i,S∣∣∣∣22 .
Since γ ∈ (0, 1], so
λMd ≤ αC
2
min
100Cmax
γ
2− γ ≤
αC2min
100Cmax
≤ αC
2
min
10Cmax
.
Therefore, we can invoke Lemma R2 when ||GMi ||∞ ≤
λM
4
. Specifically, we then have for each j,
|RMi,j | ≤ α3Cmax
∣∣∣∣wˆi,S − w∗i,S∣∣∣∣22 ≤ α3Cmax( 5α2CminλM√d
)2
=
25Cmax
αC2min
λ2Md .
This immediately yields
||RMi ||∞
λM
≤ 25Cmax
αC2min
λMd .
Theorem R4. Let M >
802C2max
C4min
(
2− γ
γ
)4
d2 log(n), and λM ≥ 8α(2− γ)
γ
√
log(n)
M
. Suppose
the sample satisfies assumptions (41), (42), and (43). Consider any player i ∈ [n]. The following
results hold with probability at least 1− 2 exp(−Cα,λλ2MM)→ 1 for i.
1. The corresponding `1-regularized optimization problem has a unique solution, i.e., a unique
set of neighbors for i.
2. The set of predicted neighbors of i is a subset of the true neighbors. Additionally, the
predicted set contains all true neighbors j for which |w∗ij | ≥
10
α2Cmin
√
dλM . In particular,
the set of true neighbors of i is exactly recovered if
min
j∈Si
|w∗ij | ≥
10
α2Cmin
√
dλM .
Taking a union bound over players, our results imply that we recover the true signed neighborhoods
for all players in the LAG with probability at least 1− 2n exp(−Cα,λλ2MM) .
Proof. Since λM ≥ 8α(2− γ)
γ
√
log(n)
M
, Lemma R1 holds. Thus, with high probability (as stated
in the theorem statement), we obtain
||GMi ||∞ ≤
λM
4
γ
2− γ ≤
γλM
4
≤ λ
4
, (58)
since γ ∈ (0, 1]. Moreover, for the specified lower bound on sample size M , a simple computation
shows
λMd ≤ αC
2
min
10Cmax
γ
2− γ . (59)
Thus the conditions required for both Lemma R2 and Lemma R3 are satisfied. By our primal-dual
construction, wˆi,Sc = 0. Furthermore, using (41), Λmin(H∗Mi,SS) > 0, and so H
∗M
i,SS is invertible.
Separating the rows in the support of i and others, we write (51) as
H∗Mi,ScS(wˆiS − w∗iS) = GMi,Sc − λM κˆi,Sc −RMi,Sc
H∗Mi,SS(wˆiS − w∗iS) = GMi,S − λM κˆi,S −RMi,S .
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These two equations can be combined into one as
H∗Mi,ScS(H
∗M
i,SS)
−1 (GMi,S − λM κˆi,S −RMi,S) = GMi,Sc − λM κˆi,Sc −RMi,Sc .
Recalling that ||κˆi,S ||∞ < 1, we immediately get that λM ||κˆi,Sc ||∞
≤ ∣∣∣∣∣∣H∗Mi,ScS(H∗Mi,SS)−1∣∣∣∣∣∣∞ (||GMi,S ||∞ + ||RMi,S ||∞ + λM) + ||GMi,Sc ||∞ + ||RMi,Sc ||∞
≤ (1− γ) (||GMi,S ||∞ + ||RMi,S ||∞ + λM) + ||GMi,Sc ||∞ + ||RMi,Sc ||∞
≤ (1− γ)λM + ||GMi ||∞ + ||RMi ||∞
≤ λM
(
1− γ + γ
4
+
γ
4
)
= λM
(
1− γ
2
)
.
Since γ ∈ (0, 1] and λM > 0, we immediately get ||κˆi,Sc ||∞ < 1. Therefore, strict dual feasibility is
established and (46) is verified. Then, using Lemma 1 of [45], we note that any optimal solution w˜i of
(44) must have w˜i,Sc = 0. In particular, we have wˆi,Sc = 0 as desired. Thus, we can focus on wˆi,S .
We now prove uniqueness of wˆi by showing that Λmin
(
HˆMi,SS
)
> 0. Let ∆ = wˆi,S − w∗i,S ∈ Rd.
Then, using Lemma R2, we have
||∆||2 ≤ 5
α2Cmin
λM
√
d .
Note that
Λmin
(
HˆMi,SS
)
= Λmin
(
1
M
M∑
m=1
ηi(wˆi;m) Φ
(m)
−i,SΦ
(m)>
−i,S
)
= Λmin
(
1
M
M∑
m=1
ηi(wˆi,S ;m) Φ
(m)
−i,SΦ
(m)>
−i,S
)
= Λmin
(
1
M
M∑
m=1
ηi(w
∗
i,S + ∆;m) Φ
(m)
−i,SΦ
(m)>
−i,S
)
.
Performing a Taylor expansion around w∗i,S , and making arguments similar to the proof segment
between (56) and (57) in Lemma 2, we can show that
Λmin
(
HˆMi,SS
)
≥ α2Cmin − α3
√
d||∆||2Cmax
≥ α2Cmin −
(
5αCmax
Cmin
)
λMd
≥ α2Cmin − α2Cmin
2
γ
2− γ
≥ α2Cmin
2
,
which is greater than 0. Therefore, HˆMi,SS is positive definite, and Lemma 1 of [45] guarantees that
wˆi is the unique optimal primal solution for (44).
We finally argue about the only remaining condition (47). In order for neighbor j to be correctly
recovered with sign, i.e., sign(wˆij) = sign(w∗ij), it suffices to have
|wˆij − w∗ij | ≤
|w∗ij |
2
. (60)
Moreover to recover the neighborhood of i exactly, it is sufficient to show
min
j∈Si
|w∗ij | ≥ 2||wˆi,S − w∗i,S ||∞ , (61)
25
which implies (60). We note that
||wˆi,S − w∗i,S ||∞ ≤ ||wˆi,S − w∗i,S ||2 ≤
5
α2Cmin
λM
√
d .
Using (61), it immediately follows that the neighborhood of i is recovered with correct sign if
min
j∈Si
|w∗ij | ≥
10
α2Cmin
λM
√
d .
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